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THE ARAFAT VISA AFFAIR: EXCEEDING THE BOUNDS
OF HOST STATE DISCRETION
Pacta sunt servanda
The U.S. refusal to permit Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization, to attend the 43d annual meeting of the General Assem-
bly' in New York was almost universally condemned as a violation of inter-
national law.2 Because Arafat publicly complied, on December 14, 1988,
with the conditions the United States had long prescribed as prerequisite for
direct contacts with the PLO,3 many have tended retroactively to validate
the refusal to grant the visa, as a pragmatic and legitimate technique of
diplomatic suasion.4 Consequently, it is all the more urgent that the record
of international legal violation be confirmed, lest the refusal be cited, in the
idiosyncratic fashion of international law, as precedent for future violations.
Such a development would hasten the deterioration of the regime of re-
straints on the discretion of host states and reduce the effectiveness of
resident international organizations.
Palestine has been a matter of international concern for most of this
century. From the inception of the United Nations, Palestine has been
continuously on its agenda.5 Since 1974, the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion6 has been, by virtue of the invitation of the General Assembly, a Perma-
nent Observer invited to participate in Assembly deliberations of concern to
it.7 It was no secret that Chairman Arafat would address the General Assem-
bly when the Palestine issue was taken up.' On November 8, 1988, a visa
'See US. Denies Arafat Entry for Speech to Session of U.N., N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1988, § 1, at 1,
col. 6; U.S. Gets Deadlinefrom U.N. on Barring Arafat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1988, at A6, col. 1;
U.S Declines to Reverse Decision on Arafat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1988, at A10, col. 1.
' See U.S. Gets Deadline from U.N. on Barring Arafat, supra note 1; U.S. Declines to Reverse
Decision on Arafat, supra note 1.
See Statement by Arafat on Peace in Mideast, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1988, at A19, col. 5; see also
U.S. Agrees to Talks with P.L.O., Saying Arafat Accepts Israel and Renounces All Terrorism, id. at Al,
col. 6.
' For elaboration of positions endorsing Secretary Shultz's denial, see U.N. Welcome, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 1988, at 5-6.
See M. S. McDOUGAL & W. M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 159 (1981).
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is "an umbrella organization for several
Arab groups dedicated to the recovery of Palestine from the state of Israel and the return of
refugees from the area to their homeland through diplomatic, military, and terrorist means."
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1397 (2d ed. 1987).
7 GA Res. 3237, 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974).
There are signs that, prior to the application for a visa, the PLO had made inquiries of the
United States and received some indications that a request would not be rejected. An indica-
tion otherwise would have permitted the PLO Chairman to refrain from requesting a visa,
saving face for himself and his organization and minimizing damage to the reputation of the
United States as the host country.
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request for Arafat to come to the headquarters district to participate in the
General Assembly session was presented to the Secretary-Geneal. On No-
vember 9, the UN Legal Counsel, according to his own testimony, person-
ally transmitted the request to Ambassador Okun, the Deputy Permanent
Representative of the United States Permanent Mission.' ° According to his
account, the Legal Counsel drew the United States official's attention to the
fact that the note was drafted in the usual form for PLO visa requests and
that the purpose of the visit was participation in the annual meeting of the
Assembly. He also claimed to have noted the sections of the Headquarters
Agreement" that provided the regime for such visas.
12
On November 27, the Department of State issued a statement announc-
ing its refusal to grant the visa.'" The statement acknowledged the obliga-
tions the United States had assumed under the Headquarters Agreement.
Nevertheless, the statement contended:
The Congress of the United States conditioned the entry of the U.S.
into the UN headquarters Agreement on the retention by the U.S.
government of the authority to bar the entry of aliens associated with or
invited by the United Nations "in order to safeguard its own security."
. . .The Headquarters Agreement, contained in Public Law
80-357, reserves to us the right to bar the entry of those who represent
a threat to our security."
On November 28, the United States representative to the Committee on
Relations with the Host Country expanded the U.S. legal position:
The Palestine Liberation organization (PLO) was invited by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1974 to participate as an observer at the
General Assembly. The United States has acknowledged that this
United Nations invitation, and the Headquarters Agreement, obligate
the United States to accord PLO observers entry, transit, and resi-
dence. Accordingly, visa waivers have been issued to PLO members for
official business at the United Nations as a routine matter, and a PLO
observer mission has been operating at the United Nations since 1975,
notwithstanding any policy differences between the United States and
the PLO.' 5
9 Statement by the Legal Counsel [Carl-August Fleischhauer] concerning the Determination
by the Secretary of State of the United States on the visa application of Mr. Yasser Arafat (Nov.
28, 1988), UN Doc. A/C.6/43/7 (1988) [hereinafter Statement by the Legal Counsel].
10 Id. at 1-2.
" Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, United Nations-United
States,June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 758, TIAS No. 1676, 11 UNTS 11, reprinted in 22 U.S.C. §287
note (1982).
,2 Statement by the Legal Counsel, supra note 9.
"s United States Department of State,'Statement on the Visa Application of Yassir Arafat,
reprinted in 83 AJIL 253 (1989).
14 Id. at 253-54.
"5 Statement by Patricia M. Byrne, United States Representative to the Committee on Rela-
tions with the Host Country, Nov. 28, 1988, Dep't of State Press Release USUN 154-(88) (Nov.
28, 1988) [hereinafter Byrne Statement].
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As a general principle, the U.S. representative continued, "[t]he United
States has not denied and will not deny a visa simply because of policy
differences with an invitee of the United Nations."' 6 The U.S. representa-
tive conditioned that principle, however, on two exceptions. The first ex-
ception was conventional: "specific provisions on the matter which exist and
on which our acceptance [of the Headquarters Agreement] was condi-
tioned." The second exception was customary: "any host country. . . has
the right to protect its national security. '"17
Both of these alleged exceptions raise complex issues of law and fact. The
first exception is of doubtful legal validity; the second appears to have been
applied in a dubious fashion. The statement by the Department on No-
vember 27 alleging a treaty basis to the exclusion,' 8 which was reaffirmed by
the U.S. representative on November 28,,' is incorrect in a number of
respects. Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement provides:
The federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not
impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district
of (1) representatives of Members or officials of the United Nations, or
of specialized agencies as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2, of the
Charter, or the families of such representatives or officials, (2) experts
performing missions for the United Nations or for such specialized
agencies, (3) representatives of the press, or of radio, film or other
information agencies, who have been accredited by the United Nations
(or by such a specialized agency) in its discretion after consultation with
the United States, (4) representatives of nongovernmental organiza-
tions recognized by the United Nations for the purpose of consultation
under Article 71 of the Charter, or (5) other persons invited to the
headquarters district by the United Nations or by such specialized
agency on official business. The appropriate American authorities shall
afford any necessary protection to such persons while in transit to or
from the headquarters district. This section does not apply to general
interruptions of transportation which are to be dealt with as provided in
Section 17, and does not impair the effectiveness of generally applicable
laws and regulations as to the operation of means of transportation.2 °
Section 12 provides: "The provisions of Section 11 shall be applicable irre-
spective of the relations existing between the Governments of thetpersons
referred to in that section and the Government of the United States.",
2'
Section 13 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Laws and regulations in force in the United States regarding the
entry of aliens shall not be applied in such manner as to interfere with
the privileges referred to in Section 11. When visas are required for
persons referred to in that Section, they shall be granted without
charge and as promptly as possible.
(d) Except as provided above in this section and in the General Con-
vention, the United States retains full control and authority over the
entry of persons or property into the territory of the United States and
the conditions under which persons may remain or reside there.
6 Id. '71d.
Is See supra note 13. " See supra note 15.
:o Headquarters Agreement, supra note 11. 21 Id.
1989]
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(e) The Secretary-General shall, at the rejuest of the appropriate
American authorities, enter into discussions with such authorities, with
a view to making arrangements for registering the arrival and depar-
ture of persons who have been granted visas valid only for transit to and
from the headquarters district and sojourn therein and in its immediate
vicinity.22
Thus, the Headquarters Agreement does not accord unilateral competence
to the host state to bar the entry of a member of one of the designated
classes in section 11 on the ground that the invitee poses a threat to national
security.
Nor does Public Law No. 80-357,23 the instrument incorporating the
Headquarters Agreement into United States domestic law and directly gov-
erning the actions of U.S. officials in their dealings with the United Nations,
contain such a reservation. That law was invoked by the Department of
State in its statement of November 27. Annex 2, section 6 of Public Law No.
80-357 states:
Nothing in the agreement shall be construed as in any way diminishing,
abridging, or weakening the right of the United States to safeguard its
own security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any
territory of the United States other than the headquarters district and
its immediate vicinity. . . and such areas as it is reasonably necessary to
traverse in transit between the same and foreign countries.
24
Public Law No. 80-357 does not authorize the Executive to bar members of
one of the classes in section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement from entry
on grounds of national security. The law does no more than to authorize the
Executive to restrict the movements of those who must be permitted to
enter but are deemed security threats to "the headquarters district and its
immediate vicinity. ' 21 Hence, the law was not dispositive of the Arafat case.
There appears to be no basis for questioning the conclusion oF the Legal
Counsel in this regard. At the meeting of the Host Country Committee
convened to deal with this problem, the Legal Counsel asserted:
Mr. Arafat's visa application is precisely to visit the Headquarters Dis-
trict and nothing else. The application thus situates itself precisely
within the scope of Section 11, precisely within the scope of the
exception provided for in 13(d) of the Headquarters Agreement and
precisely within the area left open by section 6 of Public Law 80-357."
Thus, the visa refusal had neither a treaty nor a statutory basis. Neither of




-Joint Resolution of Aug. 4, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-357, 61 Stat. 756 (1947) (22 U.S.C.
§287 note) (1982).24 Id. at 767.
2' Because Pub. L. No. 80-357 is not inconsistent with the Headquarters Agreement, the
question of its international legal force does not arise.26 Statement by the Legal Counsel, supra note 9.
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The second exception invoked by the United States as the basis for refus-
ing to issue the visa was customary: "No government can be expected to
jeopardize its national security."2 7 As the U.S. representative elaborated:
United Nations practice confirms that the host country is not ex-
pected to accept the entry of every individual to the Headquarters
District, but must retain the right to exclude the entry of individuals in
certain limited cases. This principle was established as early as 1954,
when the United States, with United Nations acquiescence, denied a
visa to Eskandary, who had been convicted of conspiring to kill the
Shah. We argued that "no one would expect the United States to
permit such a person to come to the United States, no matter what his
United Nations business." This principle has been confirmed in recent
United Nations practice. In 1981, we informed the United Nations that
we could not accept the designation as a representative of Iran a deputy
foreign minister who had been involved in the planning and attack on
our embassy in Teheran. The United Nations was again informed in
1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1988 that we would not accept the
presence in the United States of individuals with a prominent role in the
hostage incident and other acts of aggression against United States
citizens which are a clear violation of international law. There was no
objection to this United States position.
2 8
The allegation that the United Nations had been acquiescing in the serial
United States exclusions was promptly challenged. On the same day, the
UN Legal Counsel stated:
Mr. Chairman, for the record, I wish to state that the United Nations
has never acquiesced in such a practice. It is true that on certain occa-
sions, the United States has declined to issue visas to representatives of
States or to persons invited to the United Nations, and the UN Secre-
tariat has not insisted where the requesting State itself, for reasons of its
own, did not pursue the matter. The UN legal position regarding the
obligation of the Host Country to grant visas has at all times been
perlectly clear to the Host Country, as was the UN position with respect
to the so-called security reservation.2 9
In fact, the record is more complex, for the history of relations between
the United States and the United Nations on this particular issue reveals
areas of both substantial agreement and disagreement. In March and April,
1953, two nongovernmental organizations in consultative relationship with
the Economic and Social Council had designated representatives to attend a
particular session of the Council.3' The United States refused to issue the
" Byrne Statement, supra note 15.
2
H Id.
Statement by the Legal Counsel, supra note 9.
' The Women's International Democratic Federation, which had been designated a non-
governmental organization in a consultative relationship with the Economic and Social Council
in Category B, by virtue of Resolution 288 (X) of Feb. 27, 1950, designated Margarette Rae
Lucock as its representative to attend the seventh session of the Commission on the Status of
Women. The World Federation of Trade Unions, a nongovernmental organization in Cate-
gory A, had designated Jan Dessau to attend the same meeting. Seegenerally 1953 UN Y.B. 501,
UN Sales No. 1954.1.15.
19891
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visas for these representatives on the ground that it was safeguarding its
security, a privilege reserved under Public Law No. 357-80.s ' On the pro-
posal of Sweden and France, the Council decided to seek an opinion from
the UN Legal Department. The Legal Department submitted a memoran-
dum to the Economic and Social Council challenging the allegation by the
United States that it had made a reservation. The Legal Department also
observed that section 6 of Public Law No. 357-80 did not involve any
qualification of access rights under sections 11-13 of the Headquarters
Agreement." If the United States persisted in maintaining its position, the
Legal Department stated, a dispute would exist to which the negotiation and
arbitration section of the Headquarters Agreement would apply. 3 Because
the U.S. representative announced to the Council that the United States was
prepared to use the dispute-resolving machinery of section 21 of the Head-
quarters Agreement, 4 the Council adjourned its consideration of the
matter. 
35
On July 31, 1953, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the
negotiations between the United Nations and the United States.3 Accord-
ing to the Secretary-General, the United States and the United Nations had
agreed on the host country's obligation to allow transit for invitees of the
Organization: "in those negotiations, the substance of the Agreement had
been fully reaffirmed, especially with respect to persons in transit to the
Headquarters District exclusively on official business of, or before, the
United Nations."3" The parties disagreed, however, over U.S. obligations to
issue visas to people assigned to the United Nations-a class of people, one
might add, that plainly raised issues different from, and probably graver
than, those of more ephemeral visitors. The Secretary-General explained,
"As regards cases where an assignment to the United Nations, formally
entitling a person to a visa, served to cover another activity in the United
States considered to be against the security of that country, it might be open
to discussion whether they fell under the Agreement or not."I3M The Secre-
tary-General expressed the view that even these cases fell within the Head-
quarters Agreement, which, he felt, should be strictly interpreted. As a
result, he believed that he was not entitled to permit the United States the
refusal competence it claimed.
Nevertheless, the Secretary-General expressed a broad principle that
showed considerable sensitivity to the concerns of a host state:
s, 15 UN ESCOR (679th mtg.) at 37, UN Doc. E/SR.679 (1953).
s2 15 UN ESCOR Annexes (Agenda Item 34) at 2, UN Doc. E/2397 (1953).
Id. at 3.
4 15 UN ESCOR (686th mtg.) at 83, UN Doc. E/SR.686 (1953).
s 15 UN ESCOR (687th mtg.) at 89, UN Doc. E/SR.687 (1953).
s 16 UN ESCOR (743d mtg.) at 249-56, UN Doc. E/SR.743 (1953); 16 UN ESCOR
(745th mtg.) at 267-75, UN Doc. E/SR.745 (1953). For the report of the Secretary-General,
see 16 UN ESCOR Annexes (Agenda Item 33) at 1, UN Doc. E/2492 (1953); id. at 2, UN Doc.
E/2501 (1953) (oral statement subsequently distributed as a document).
7 Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 9 UN GAOR
Supp. (No. 1) at 101, UN Doc. A/2663 (1954).3
8 Id.
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[U]se of the rights under the Agreement in such cases [considered by
the host state to be against its security] would, in fact, represent an
abuse which would be against the interests of the United Nations and
would, therefore, in fact be against the spirit of the Headquarters
Agreement. If and when such a case were to arise it would have to be
mutually studied on the basis of all the evidence supplied by the United
States authorities to the Secretary-General, and if agreement were not
reached, the problem would have to be solved under the Agreement,
that was to say, by arbitration.
39
According to the Secretary-General, the United Nations and the United
States had reached agreement about a procedure to be followed in case of
disagreement on visas: the United States would take its decision at the
highest levels; the decision would be taken in due time to allow the United
Nations to consider the matter while it was still of practical significance; and
the Secretary-General would be supplied to the greatest extent possible with
the information on which the United States was basing its decision so as to
allow an independent check.4" This arrangement was presented by the Sec-
retary-General as an appropriate compromise: "This procedure . ..of-
fered a basis on which it would be possible. . . to safeguard the interests of
the United Nations, while recognizing the legitimate interests of the United
States, and acting in accordance with the Headquarters Agreement as it
stood."'" The Secretary-General's report was discussed by the Council and
adopted.4
The Secretariat never challenged the competence of the United States to
restrict the movement of visa holders to the headquarters district and its
environs but also never acknowledged a unilateral right of the host Govern-
ment to exclude invitees. Then-Secretary-General Dag Hammarskj6ld con-
ceded that it was arguable that a host state might lawfully refuse to grant a
visa, the Headquarters Agreement notwithstanding, if there were clear evi-
dence that the person in question intended to use the trip for activities
against the host state's security, on the theory that it would no longer be
covered by the Agreement. This conditional customary exception, as we
might call it, is hardly a startling proposition: the inherent right of a host
state to bar aliens in spite of its international obligations, if those aliens
posed such a direct threat to the national security that their entry would
imperil it, is a most modest elaboration of self-defense and self-preservation.
But this concession was premised on procedural obligations. Difficult ques-
tions of fact would undoubtedly arise, to which the consultation and third-
party dispute resolution procedures of the Headquarters Agreement would
apply. The application and potential of these procedures for restraining
abuse of the unilateral discretion was plainly fundamental to the under-
standing of the customary exception. 3
"" Id. 401d.
41 Id.
" ESC Res. 509, 16 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 19, UN Doc. E/2508 (1953), reprinted in
1953 UN Y.B., supra note 30, at 503.
I" Since the ICJ's decision on jurisdiction and admissibility in the Nicaragua case, the U.S.
position appears to have been that such questions are not susceptible to third-party decision,
1989]
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1
There is no indication that any of the cases cited by the U.S, representa-
tive would qualify under the customary exception. None of the cases con-
cerned people assigned to the United Nations. None of the people to whom
visas were denied, it would appear, planned to exploit their presence in the
United States to endanger its security.44
In fact, the Arafat visa affair concerns a different issue. The cases cited by
the U.S. representative and a further statement explaining the reasons for
the exclusion of Arafat indicate that the United States is seeking to expand
the customary right of exclusion. Until now, the right of exclusion has been
limited to people posing a threat to the United States by their presence in
the headquarters district. Henceforth, if the U.S. claim were to be accepted,
this right would include (1) "wicked people," in the view of the United
States; (2) people who have harmed U.S. interests or citizens in the past; and
(3) people who, in the view of the United States, have violated international
law. These grounds are apparently discretionary rather than mandatory and
serve only U.S. interests. The grounds are not enforcement of some sort of
universal jurisdiction. In addition, the United States is rejecting any collabo-
rative procedural obligation and assuming that it is endowed in this matter
with entirely unilateral competence.
Arafat was excluded on the basis of the second and third new exceptions.
The U.S. representative stated:
In this case, the United States has convincing evidence that PLO
elements have engaged in terrorism against Americans and others. This
evidence includes a series of operations taken by the Force 17 and the
Hawari organizations since the PLO claimed to foreswear the use of
terrorism in the Cairo Declaration of November 1985. As Chairman of
the PLO, Mr. Arafat is responsible for actions of these organizations,
which are units of Fatah, an element of the PLO of which he also is
Chairman and which is under his control. Having found that Mr.
Arafat, as Chairman of the PLO, knows of, condones, and lends sup-
port to terrorism against Americans, the United States found that Mr.
Arafat is an accessory to such terrorism and accordingly denied the
45visa.
None of these grounds has any basis in the Headquarters Agreement or in
the customary exception. Moreover, all of them have been applied inconsis-
tently, depending on the short-term interests of the United States. Many
people who have been issued visas under sections 9-11 of the Headquarters
Agreement would fall within one or more of the categories recited by the
U.S. representative.
raising questions about the continuing effectiveness of the 1954 compromise. See United States:
Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 24 ILM 246 (1985); Observations on the International Court of
Justice's November 26, 1984 Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Case of Nica-
ragua v. United States of America, id. at 249. Although the reach of the procedural arrange-
ments may now be in contention, the customary exception itself, the substantive acknowledg-
ment of the right of the host state to act to protect itself in appropriate fashion, does not appear
to have been qualified or withdrawn.
44 See text accompanying note 28 supra. 4 Byrne Statement, supra note 15.
HeinOnline -- 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 526 1989
EDITORIAL COMMENTS
However deplorable certain methods adopted by the PLO and/or groups
operating in its name, Chairman Arafat's presence in the United States per se
posed no security threat to the host state. Indeed, Secretary of State Shultz,
in responding to press queries, as much as acknowledged that fact. Arafat
was barred because of the personal animus of the Secretary, the widespread
aversion to policies and practices of his organization, the fear that Arafat
would "exploit" his presence diplomatically (the very raison d'tre of inter-
national politics in a UN-type forum) and the belief that the exclusion would
be diplomatically useful to the United States.
The U.S. action in the Arafat visa affair violated the nation's conventional
and customary obligations. Like many international legal violations, the
action also represents a claim for new law, for in the international system it is
unfortunately too often the case that ex delicto oriturjus. If the new claim to a
unilateral right of exclusion is accepted, the host state will henceforth be in a
position to exploit its status by using and conditioning admission to UN
headquarters as its own instrument of policy. Were such grounds for refusal
by host countries to allow a treaty-authorized invitee to enter their territory
to become lawful, international organizations would find it increasingly
difficult to operate. Whether it is examined de lege lata or de legeferenda, this
treaty violation bodes ill for both the United Nations and the United States,
a country that ultimately depends, as much as any other, on the integrity of
the regime of international agreements.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE PUBLIC FORUM: THE NEW
YoRK TIMES AND THE LIBYAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLANT
Nations typically act first and worry about legalities afterwards. Interna-
tional lawyers thus find themselves relegated, for the most part, to the
passive role of sorting out rationalizations of past events.' Once in a while,
however, when a democratic government is contemplating an action that is
legally questionable, international lawyers may have a chance to play a more
active role. The government at that time might decide to introduce the issue
of the legality of its contemplated action into the public forum, either in the
hope that open debate may help pave the way for public acceptance of
whatever action the government ultimately chooses to take or, more charit-
ably, in a genuine search for the public will on the matter. The primary
' In a previous editorial, I discussed some aspects of governmental vs. academic international
law rationalizations. See D'Amato, Nicaragua and International Law: The "Academic" and the
"Real," 79 AJIL 657 (1985).
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